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Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia 
REMEMBRANCES OF JUSTICE SCALIA AND 
REFLECTIONS ON HIS JURISPRUDENCE 
Rosalie Berger Levinson* 
In the summer of 1993, I was offered the unique experience of teaching 
with Justice Scalia in Cambridge, England.  Ed Gaffney, who was then the 
Dean, had developed a friendship with the Justice during their time 
together in the Justice Department.  The Justice, of course, selected the 
topic, and he chose Separation of Powers.  I knew that the students would 
be quite intimidated at the thought of responding to questions from Justice 
Scalia, who already had earned the reputation of being a tough 
interrogator.  So, the plan was for me to go to Cambridge two weeks early 
to prepare our students for the Justice’s arrival. 
On the first day of class, Justice Scalia began by asking the students 
where in the Constitution the doctrine of separation of powers is found.  
Being a textualist, the Justice’s question was not unanticipated, and I had 
spent numerous hours trying to help students gain confidence in 
responding to such questions.  Several enthusiastically raised their hands.  
Justice Scalia called upon one who stated that the powers of each of the 
three branches are separately set forth in the first three Articles of the 
Constitution.  The student was immediately met with the Justice’s 
outstretched arm pointing at his face while he shouted “Wrong!”  All my 
work building the students’ self-confidence was destroyed in five seconds. 
Things had already not started out terribly well.  In preparation for 
the course, Justice Scalia sent me all the cases that he intended to cover 
with the students.  In addition, I decided to add one law review article, 
which was critical of Justice Scalia’s originalism jurisprudence.  It seemed 
appropriate for the students to read something on the other side.  
Apparently Justice Scalia did not think so.  At our first introduction, he 
responded as follows:  “Mrs. (not Professor) Levinson, why would you 
include that ridiculous law review article criticizing me?”  He apparently 
felt there could be no just criticism of originalism, and, over the years, he 
became more and more dismissive of his critics.  Notably, in response to 
questions about the holding in Bush v. Gore he harshly told critics “to get 
over it.” 
On the other hand, Justice Scalia criticized his fellow Justices for 
resting their opinions on their personal views.  After his death, Ted Cruz 
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remarked that Justice Scalia, in contrast, was “steadfast and true to his 
beliefs.”  Cruz is accurate that the Justice remained true to his beliefs; 
however, these were not his beloved beliefs in originalism, federalism, 
and judicial restraint—the doctrines he extolled that summer in 
Cambridge. 
First, as to originalism, I think the Framers would have been surprised 
to learn that corporations have the same First Amendment speech and 
freedom of religion rights as natural persons.  They would have been 
surprised to hear that commercial speech should be given the same 
protection as political speech, even though commercial speech was not 
recognized as entitled to any constitutional protection at all until the year 
1976.  They would have been surprised to know that a prohibition on 
selling violent, interactive video games to minors without parental 
consent interfered with the First Amendment. 
As to federalism and judicial restraint, the most classic repudiation of 
these two favored doctrines was the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore where 
Justice Scalia joined his conservative brethren, all Republican presidential 
appointments, in taking the issue of vote counting away from the State of 
Florida, contrary to comity, and simultaneously depriving the people of 
the right to elect their president.  Further, the Justice did not exercise 
judicial restraint when he joined in numerous decisions striking down acts 
of Congress which held state government employers liable for disability 
discrimination and age discrimination.  He also ignored judicial restraint 
when he found the Voting Rights Act, as well as campaign finance reform 
laws, to be unconstitutional. 
Although Justice Scalia rallied for originalism, judicial restraint, and 
federalism to rein in the power of the Court, ultimately he abandoned 
these doctrines when they interfered with his personal moral, political, 
and religious beliefs.  Professor Geoffrey Stone of the University of 
Chicago persuasively documents this in his review of twenty of the 
Court’s more important decisions between 2000 and 2013.  He found, not 
too coincidentally, that every one of Justice Scalia’s votes in these cases, 
which involved a wide range of subjects, “tracked perfectly the 
conservative political position.”1  I agree with Ted Cruz that Justice Scalia 
was “steadfast and true to his beliefs.”  The problem is these beliefs 
sometimes translated into a legal analysis that looked like “pure 
applesauce” (to quote the Justice himself). 
Actually, over the years, I came to appreciate Justice Scalia’s 
combative, sarcastic, polarizing style.  His opinions became more and 
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more acerbic, which made it less and less likely that he could convince his 
colleagues to join him.  He could have been much more dangerous to 
progressive values in light of his brilliant analytical skills as well as his 
wit. 
Scalia championed originalism, but he could not persuade anyone but 
Justice Thomas to follow this doctrine.  Other Justices recognized that 
originalism yielded disparate results.  Justice Stevens, for example, who 
dissented from Scalia’s recognition of a right to carry guns, invoked 
sources from the founding era to support the belief that the Framers did 
not intend to protect an individual’s right to bear arms.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court followed Justice Stevens’ interpretation of the Second 
Amendment until the year 2009.  Prior Courts viewed the text and 
founding history to create only a right on the part of the militia to carry 
guns.   
Similarly, Justice Scalia relied on originalism to reject the idea that the 
First Amendment speech provision includes the right to speak 
anonymously, whereas his co-originalist Justice Thomas argued that since 
the founding fathers in fact authored the Federalist Papers anonymously 
there is a history of anonymity being an important aspect of speech in a 
true free democracy.  Further, fellow originalist Justice Thomas dissented 
to Justice Scalia’s opinion striking down a law that prohibited the sale of 
violent, interactive video games to minors without parental consent.  
Justice Thomas explained that the Framers believed that parents have the 
right to determine what materials children should view and that 
disseminators of these horrific, violent video games should not have 
access to children without parental consent. 
A more blatant example of Justice Scalia’s failure to adhere to 
originalism is his insistence that affirmative action is prohibited by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which he interpreted to require the government 
to follow color-blind policies.  In truth, at the time the Amendment was 
ratified, the federal government passed several laws granting special 
privileges to African Americans to rectify the negative impact of slavery.  
Despite these historical discrepancies, Justice Scalia refused to 
acknowledge that originalism may not truly enable judges to decide cases 
neutrally. 
To end on a more positive note, I will concede that Justice Scalia 
certainly could be warm, engaging, and witty.  After our initial bad start, 
I escorted Justice Scalia to various functions in Cambridge, and we had 
several conversations where he revealed his lighter, more charming 
disposition.  By the end of the week Justice Scalia, in fact, invited me to 
come with him to meet the Justices of the Canadian Supreme Court who 
were having a judicial conference in Cambridge the same week.  By this 
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time, Justice Scalia had learned that I spoke French, and he thought it 
would be fun to have me converse with the French Canadian Justices in 
their native tongue.  We really had a pleasant time together, which helps 
me understand how Justice Ginsburg could disagree with him 
ideologically in so many significant ways and yet refer to him as her “best 
buddy” on the Court.  As Justice Scalia put it, one can like the person, 
while disliking his ideas. 
After his experience with us that summer, Justice Scalia was 
instrumental in helping to persuade his colleagues, Justice Ginsburg, 
Justice Thomas, and Justice Rehnquist, to participate in our Cambridge 
program, thereby exposing numerous Valpo Law students to the unique 
and memorable opportunity of actually sitting in a classroom with a 
Supreme Court Justice.  In addition, Justice Scalia, as well as his 
colleagues, came to Valpo Law to judge our Moot Court competition and 
to guest lecture in our classes.  In short, Justice Scalia was a friend to Valpo 
Law—he had an impact on our students and on our reputation. 
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